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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The objective of this report is to provide a preliminary assessment of the development 
of the Hurunui Waiau Zone Implementation Programme as a collaborative planning 
exercise to progress the implementation of the Canterbury Water Management 
Strategy (CWMS) in the Hurunui Waiau catchments.  This report builds on an earlier 
study (Lomax, Memon and Painter, 2010) on the development of the CWMS as an 
innovative collaborative regional strategy to address exacerbating conflicts over the 
allocation and management of freshwater resources in the Canterbury region in New 
Zealand.  Past attempts to satisfactorily address these concerns within the framework 
of the Resource Management Act 1991 statutory planning regime have encountered 
significant barriers.  The formulation and implementation of the CWMS is expected to 
overcome these barriers by having adopted a collaborative governance model.  This 
report reflects upon and presents observations of the Hurunui Waiau Zone 
Implementation Programme process.  As such, it flags for the Canterbury Regional 
Council a number of issues which have emerged from this valuable learning experience 
and concludes with a number of questions drawn from our observations for 
consideration by the CRC with zone committees and other stakeholder groups and 
recommendations for research. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Collaborative dialogic governance approaches, informed by different ways of knowing, 
are advocated in the current academic literature to resolve deep-seated freshwater 
resource conflicts (Scholz and Stiftel, 2005; Warner, 2007; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2008; Berry 
and Mollard, 2010).  Allocation and management of water resources in Canterbury, 
New Zealand, have become highly contested during the last two decades.  This is a 
reflection of rapidly increasing water demand for multiple and competing uses.  The 
Canterbury Water Management Strategy (henceforth the Strategy or CWMS) is a 
potentially innovative strategic planning initiative based on a relatively informal 
collaborative governance model.  It provides strategic direction on the allocation and 
management of available surface and groundwater freshwater resources in the 
Canterbury region.  A key attribute of the Strategy is that it was developed through an 
informed collaboratively-derived consensus amongst local Canterbury government 
elected leaders, senior officials and key water stakeholder groups.  Implementation of 
the Strategy is likewise being undertaken via collaborative processes at regional and 
zonal levels.  
 
A key reason for initially adopting the relatively informal, non-statutory pathway on the 
regional and zonal basis relates to widely shared concerns amongst key water 
stakeholders in Canterbury about the Resource Management Act 1991 (henceforth the 
RMA).  The RMA pathway to resolve water conflicts is seen as resulting in relatively 
adversarial, costly and time consuming statutory planning processes that has not been 
capable of dealing with cumulative environmental effects.  At the time of its inception, 
the Strategy represented an expectation that informed deliberation amongst relevant 
stakeholders in a non-statutory process would lessen the risks of subsequent conflicts 
during the course of implementing the Strategy under the RMA processes.  These 
concerns and expectations are supported in the recent academic literature on 
collaborative planning.  From a theoretical perspective, the CWMS embodies many of 
the essential elements for an innovative collaborative water governance regime and 
represents considerable promise for managing water in an integrated and participatory 
way.   
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2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
This report is part of our research programme on water governance in Canterbury 
(Memon and Skelton, 2007; Memon and Weber, 210; Memon and Kirk, 2012; Weber, 
Memon and Painter, 2011).  It builds on a recent study on the development of the 
CWMS as an innovative collaborative regional strategy to address exacerbating conflicts 
over the allocation and management of freshwater resources in the Canterbury region 
in New Zealand (Lomax, Memon and Painter, 2010). 
 
This report focuses on the decision-making process we have witnessed at the zonal 
level.  Specifically, our research examined the deliberative process followed by the 
Hurunui Waiau Zone Committee (HWZC) in the development of its Zone 
Implementation Programme (ZIP).   As an innovative collaborative planning process well 
rehearsed in theory, the aim of our research has been to examine the relative strengths 
and weaknesses of the governance process that have culminated in the production of 
the HWZC ZIP.  Hence, the research question that guided our research was how has the 
Strategy been implemented in practice?  A key additional question that arose as the 
research proceeded was how has the Canterbury Regional Council managed its dual 
role of facilitator of the process and regulator?  
 
Our report provides preliminary reflections on these questions.  Accordingly, set within 
the broader context of the drivers which have shaped the CWMS and its priorities and 
targets, this report focuses on the process undertaken to develop the ZIP as a 
collaborative planning exercise, and raises questions about the context of the policy 
recommendations contained in the ZIP as the key formative output of the collaborative 
process.  The research on which this report is based was funded by the Canterbury 
Regional Council (also known as Environment Canterbury).   
 
The data collection and analysis approach for the report was three-pronged: 
1. A review of the international collaborative water governance literature was 
undertaken. 
2. Regular attendance and observation of committee meetings. 
3. Review of published and unpublished documentary resources. 
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The third author of this report attended all except one of the meetings of the HWZC and 
Regional Committee during the period April to September 2011 while the other two 
authors also attended some of the meetings.  The meeting proceedings were recorded 
and an in-depth report was prepared after each meeting based on observations and 
reflections.  These confidential notes, together with formal meeting minutes and 
published and unpublished documentary information, coupled with weekly discussions 
by the research team are the main data sources on which this report is based.  While 
we have been involved in informal conversations with various zone committee 
members and others involved in the collaborative process over the past twelve months, 
we  have not held formal interviews with members of the HWZC, the CRC or other 
stakeholders because it was agreed premature to do so.  We would like to conduct 
these interviews after the finalisation of the statutory RMA planning instruments and 
the implementation of measures for improving water quality in these catchments has 
progressed.  We will need to secure further funding for this research.  For these 
reasons, the findings of this report should be regarded as preliminary.  The authors are 
also very aware that the Hurunui Waiau Zone Committee was the first to be established 
and consequently what occurred in the development of its ZIP and the associated 
proposed Hurunui Waiau River Regional Plan (HWRRP) may not be replicated in other 
zones.  Nevertheless, we believe that there is considerable value in reflecting on issues 
that have arisen at this early stage of the implementation of the CWMS. 
A significant omission in this report is that we do not address the issue of the role of 
Maori in governance of the Hurunui-Waiau rivers within the HWZC framework.  This is 
an important consideration that requires further study.   
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3. THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
Water conflicts in the 21st century generally belong to the class of ‘wicked problems’ 
(Rittel and Webber 1973) which fail to be adequately resolved by regulatory agencies 
accountable to elected leaders. Water conflicts, along with other wicked problems, 
involve a complexity which is caused by goals and means of stakeholders becoming 
inseparable, as well as the dynamics of socio-ecological processes which characterise 
water as a multiple use common pool resource.  Traditional top-down hierarchical 
government institutions often lack capacity to avert water conflicts (Memon and 
Skelton, 2007).  What needs to be recognised in these situations is that optimal 
solutions are unlikely to exist and ‘best’ solutions are a ‘mirage’ (Innes and Booher, 
2010).  On this basis, it is argued in the literature that the aim should therefore be to 
engage diverse actors “in dialogue [that] offer[s] a wide variety of experience, 
knowledge, and ideas that offer a rich terrain of options to explore” (2010, 9-10).  
A growing realisation regarding these dilemmas amongst environmental policy and 
planning theorists has caused a shift in their ideas about how institutions which deal 
with water conflict should be configured.  We refer to this shift as the ‘collaborative 
turn’ in water governance, which is typified by the European continental theories about 
discursive ethics proposed by Jurgen Habermas (Habermas, 1984). The Habermasian 
school of deliberation asks how people with different conceptions of the good life can 
shape a co-existent and just society?  Habermas answers by proposing a process of 
discursive arguments where the norms and rules of a society are decided by the force of 
the better argument. This regards language and the exchange of ideas in deliberative 
forums as the source of social reform; regarding knowledge as something which can 
weave between debates presented on opposing sides. 
 
The ‘collaborative turn’ in water governance in Western property owning democracies 
is grounded in a complex series of factors which include concerns about social and 
ecological impacts of the neoliberal political project; an attempt to solve the cynicism 
and disengagement of citizens from political processes; a deeper understanding of the 
social exclusion some (e.g. indigenous peoples) feel in regards to decisions relating to 
allocation and management of resources; and finally a realisation by government 
agencies that ‘wicked problems’ such as non-point source water pollution need to 
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include multiple stakeholders from private, public  and community sectors (Barnes et 
al., 2004; Maginn, 2007; Memon and Weber, 2010; Memon and Kirk, 2012).  
 
The strengths of and barriers to collaborative approaches based on deliberation have 
been the primary focus of both political scientists (e.g. Bohman, 1998; Pettit, 2001; 
Williams, 2004) and planning scholars (Flyvberg, 1998; Healey, 1998; Tewdwr-Jones and 
Allmendinger, 2002; Memon and Weber, 2010).  It is argued that a collaborative turn 
will promote governance legitimacy (Dryzek, 2001); foster better decisions (Forester, 
1999) and widen participation to include previously disinterested or disempowered 
stakeholders (Versteeg and Hajer, 2010).  On the other hand, deliberative processes 
have been criticised for a number of reasons: it is easier for well-educated and middle 
class citizens to participate in the deliberative process (Versteeg and Hajer, 2010; Ryfe, 
2005); the sizes of the group have a large role in deciding the success of the 
deliberation process (Parkinson, 2006); the Habermasian notion of ‘ideal speech’ 
situation being possible to achieve and available to all is unrealistic (Mouffe, 1999; 
Bond, 2011) and more generally, as a theory, it fails to elucidate the pervasive impacts 
of social factors (Fraser, 1987; Ryan, 1992) and veiled political power (Hillier 2003). 
 
The focus of communicative planning scholars has been on the quality of the 
collaborative process itself.  Innes and Booher (2010, p. 97), for example, emphasise the 
need for “authentic dialogue” which they define as being “accurate in a scientific sense, 
comprehensible, sincere and legitimate”.  They claim that well run processes come 
close to achieving these aims by: 
a. Using expert knowledge (and preferably triangulation of the views of more than one 
expert); 
b. Ensuring that all participants fully understand what other participants or experts 
have said and therefore there exists a shared understanding of an issue; 
c. Having face to face dialogue, communal meals, group trips etc which all help to 
ensure that participants get to know each other and therefore find it harder to be 
insincere and are more likely to acknowledge their real concerns; 
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d. Having stakeholders that have the authority to speak for a constituency or who 
speak for “the knowledge, concerns and interests of a category of people who are 
not or could not be organized” or who speak for themselves, based on their own 
experience (2010, 98-99). 
 
The goal of such dialogue, Innes and Booher argue, “is not to choose who or what is 
right, nor even what is true or best, but to find actions that all or most can support and 
that are [creative and] workable” (2010, p. 100). 
 
Elinor Ostrom (1990) proposed eight design principles for management of common 
pool resources.  Her principles were evaluated by Cox et al. (2010) in a meta-analysis of 
91 empirical studies of collaboration.  Cox et al. found that the following design 
principles were strongly supported: 
 The benefits obtained by users of the resource must be proportional to the input 
costs (labour, materials, money etc); 
 Rules that regulate access to a resource are customised to reflect local conditions; 
 It is clearly understood by all who the legitimate resource users are. 
 
Ansell and Gash (2008) conducted a meta-analysis of 137 cases to ascertain the critical 
variables that produce a successful collaboration.  They found that the following factors 
were important:  
 Issues present at the beginning of the collaboration effort have an influence over 
the level of cooperation received from stakeholders e.g. the level of previous 
antagonism; 
 Power imbalances between stakeholders are common and if this is the case, the 
process will be prone to manipulation by the stronger actors; 
 Facilitative leadership is critical particularly at times of disunity.  It is also important 
in building trust, exploring mutual gains and empowering and involving 
stakeholders; 
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 Face to face dialogue, trust building, commitment to the process by all participants 
and a shared understanding are all considered to be vital to the success of the 
process. 
 
 
Other authors that have contributed to this debate include the following:  
1. Hillier (2002; 2003) and Mouffe (2000), in critical response to the Habermasian 
school of communicative rationality, argue that conflict is a healthy development in 
collaborative situations because, handled sensitively, it can lead to creative and 
radical solutions; 
2. Versteeg and Hajer (2010) maintain that collaborative governance methods 
increase the chances of previously disinterested people becoming involved but that 
it is easier for well-educated and middle class citizens to participate than for 
marginalised groups; 
3. Ryan (1992) claims that equity issues such as gender and ethnicity are usually not 
adequately addressed; 
4. Elliot (1999) suggests that the use of a neutral facilitator improves the chances of 
success; 
5. Lawrence argues that members of a collaborative committee must be able to 
disassociate their modus operandi from their decision making and thus ensure that 
“radical reassessment and re-alignment of production regimes” is not off the 
agenda (2005, p. 157); 
6. Mehta et al. criticize collaborative projects that use a simplistic view of community 
i.e. that it is “homogeneous, bounded, local and designated to a particular “user 
group”, neglecting questions of social difference and the diverse” (2001, p. 4). 
7. Bryson et al (2006) state that having linking mechanisms in place (such as networks, 
powerful sponsors or objects that span boundaries) as well as ensuring that 
knowledge held by the community is integrated with that of experts will together 
contribute to the success of a collaborative undertaking.  
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Having articulated the theoretical context that has served as the lens through which we 
have observed this collaborative process and contributed to our understandings of it, we 
now move onto presenting and discussing our research findings. 
 
 
4. HOW WELL HAS THE HWZC PROCESS WORKED? 
In general terms, it is our view that the collaborative process within the HWZC has 
worked reasonably well.  Overall, we observed that members of the HWZC became quite 
familiar with and trusting   of each other.  While it could be argued that the spirit and 
implementation of collaboration was not assisted by demanding timeframes and 
externally imposed deadlines, it could equally be argued that these pressures facilitated 
the process.  Either way, it is our observation that in meeting its timelines, work 
undertaken by the HWZC was challenging and demanding for all committee members.  
Indeed, in the final stages of the development of the ZIP, members of the HWZC 
commented that they were ‘exhausted’.  It was also our observation that the 
proceedings were by no means smooth sailing and amicable all the way.   
 
A key aspect of the Habermasian-inspired collaborative governance model is that 
dialogue in a deliberative forum enables stakeholders to put forward their often 
divergent viewpoints in good faith.  The potentially powerful outcome of such practice is 
that by doing so others come to understand another’s point of view – to stand in the 
shoes of another.  If anything is to be taken from the HWZC governance process, it 
appears to be a success on this score.  It was observed that representatives of the HWZC 
had not only moved to accommodating each other’s positions, but also to 
acknowledging and on some occasions defending another’s position in his or her 
absence.  
 
 
4.1 Inclusiveness 
While members of the zone committee built a rapport with each other, an important 
question for us as observers was whether each member’s peer group would endorse 
their changed views?  Obviously, the standing that these people have in the community 
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is expected to contribute to public acceptance of their decisions within the committee.  
However, given how far the committee members appeared to have moved to 
accommodate each other, we were asking how far these accommodations could extend 
outside the committee?   
 
This issue appeared to be recognised by the HWZC and we observed that its members 
made considerable effort to engage with stakeholder groups and this continued after 
the ZIP had been finalised.  Of course, this strategy is substantially limited given the lack 
of remuneration and time available for zone committee members.  The question we are 
now asking is whether consensus around collaboration and the Strategy is anchored to 
the energy of zone committee members?  If so, this is clearly unsustainable.  It is our 
view that the CRC needs to be thinking about how to sustain these broader and critical 
links that could be viewed as a ‘safety net’ for the decisions derived from the 
collaborative process and its ongoing outcomes on the basis that collaboration is a 
marathon, not a sprint. 
 
The issue of inclusion is critical for collaborative governance and presents a challenge for 
the CRC given the design of the zone committees and how they were originally 
established.  In theory, and reflecting practice reported in the United States (e.g. Innes 
and Booher 2010), everyone who has a stake and wants to have a say should be given 
the opportunity to participate as members rather than having to rely on their interests 
being represented (or not) or by making submissions on decisions already substantially 
finalised.  On this basis, the HWZC was limited in its constitution as a truly collaborative 
process, particularly to the extent that its membership was handpicked.  Clearly, it is not 
practical in  the Canterbury  situation  to aim to include everyone but if the CWMS 
genuinely hopes that “Allocation decisions will be resolved in most cases without 
resorting to the courts” (CWMS, 2009, p. 6) within 10 years time, then the possibility of 
alienated, disaffected or ‘unconsulted’ stakeholders may need to be considered.   
Figure 1 illustrates the zone committee context and shows a hierarchy of stakeholder 
involvement that could be useful for the CRC to reflect upon to consider how it might 
engage with these different levels of inclusion.   
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Figure 1: Inclusiveness of the HWZC ZIP Process. 
The recently released publications by the CRC, namely, Wai Water and the Canterbury 
Water – The Regional Context: Supporting the Canterbury Water Management Strategy, 
are excellent documents that will assist in reaching the broader publics.  However, the 
critical science communication literature (e.g. Irwin and Wynne, 1996) would caution 
that a consultation strategy reliant on publications can limit dialogue to a one-way flow 
between an authority and its constituency.  What is problematic about this modus 
operandi is that it usually assumes, firstly, that the publications will be read and, 
secondly, that they will be read by willing and relatively informed readers.  
Unfortunately, this is often not the case.  Hence, the literature advocates the 
development of communication channels that facilitate two-way dialogue around an 
issue that does not impose pre-conceived ideas about what the issues are and their 
solutions (Irwin and Wynne, 1996).  Indeed, the literature argues that imposed and 
narrowly defined framings of problems and solutions can alienate people (Wynne, 
2001).  Two way communications can take the form of periodic phone surveys, 
continued public meetings or a network of communication that utilises already 
established groups and organisations. 
 
 
 
Zone Committee 
Face to face consultation  
with selected stakeholders 
stakeholderstakeholders 
Stakeholders that made a submission  
but had no face to face contact with ZC 
Stakeholders that were excluded from the 
 process or who chose not to participate 
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4.2 Process Facilitation 
It is our view that no committee member would say that they had been denied the 
opportunity to speak during meetings.  However, some might say that the ideas or 
issues that they raised did not get fully discussed, especially if other committee 
members did not immediately appreciate and acknowledge the significance of their 
issue.  For example, one member with an interest in the benefits of increased 
development in the area had raised at more than one meeting the issue of the nitrogen 
load limit stopping new farming development in the area but the issue was not 
addressed and he became frustrated by this.   
 
We observed that some issues were elaborated or extra information was provided while 
others were left unexplored. We are not sure if this was done on purpose. Examples of 
potentially critical issues not resolved or explored and adequately debated in the lead 
up to the finalisation of the ZIP include:  
 The HWZC is aware that there is no guarantee that implementation of best 
practices will result in the outcomes listed in the ZIP, particularly if further 
farming intensification takes place.  The Committee has discussed the need to 
monitor and adjust limits/outcomes if necessary (i.e. use adaptive management); 
however, the implications of this for the farming community and the extent to 
which this is understood by that community is not clear. 
 One member asked for information on the economic effects of the ZIP 
recommendations on local communities and particularly wished to hear from 
“bankers, accountants, economic consultants” or the like.  Time pressures may 
have made this untenable but the financial and economic implications of the ZIP 
recommendations remains an open issue. 
We observed that often issues, such as these, were raised at meetings but then were left 
hanging with little or no discussion or committee members would express their 
individual views on the respective issue but then no elaboration would follow.  
Notwithstanding the clarity that appears in the zone committee meeting minutes, from 
our observation of the meeting dynamics, resolution on some of these critical issues was 
not so clear cut.  This raised questions for us about how well the HWZC was deliberating 
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as distinct from collaborating.  In theory, deliberation – the thoughtful articulation and 
consideration of an issue that considers its dimensions from multiple angles – is key to 
collaborative governance.   
 
It is our view that there needed to be a better process for adequately investigating and 
reflecting on the consequences of decisions that were reached.  We were concerned 
that not all committee members fully understood the underlying assumptions and 
advantages/disadvantages of committee decisions.  Often, the committee members 
were encouraged to “not think like planners” and to focus on outcomes and targets 
rather than on detailed implementation.  However, as the translation of ZIP 
recommendations into the proposed HWRRP process has shown, the consequences of 
broad level recommendations do not always become apparent or fully understood until 
the detailed implementation is addressed.   
 
We felt that if, at least for major decisions, the underlying assumptions, advantages and 
disadvantages were more clearly laid out then all committee members would be made 
more aware of the implications (positive and negative) of the decisions that they were 
agreeing to.  Such practice   may encourage some of the more silent members of the 
committee to take part in discussions.  This should enable the committee as a whole to 
be more confident that the decisions reached were a true reflection of all stakeholder 
views rather than reflecting the views of the more articulate, quick to understand, 
members. 
 
It is on this basis that we recommend an expanded the role for the Facilitator and the 
Chair.  An expanded Facilitator role could be charged with ensuring that all members of 
a committee have an adequate  understanding of an issue, that the science has been 
well explained in layperson’s terms and successfully integrated with local knowledge and 
that the views of relevant stakeholders have been included.  As explained in a case study 
from Innes and Booher (2010, p. 61) “the director [i.e. facilitator] frequently articulated 
and reframed his interpretation of the meaning of group members’ statements until all 
parties were satisfied that they understood one another”.  A person in this role could 
also play the part of ‘devil’s advocate’ and challenge the committee’s or an expert’s 
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views in order to tease out environmental, social, economic and cultural implications.  
Similarly, there is scope for an expanded role for the chairperson.  Innes and Booher 
(2010, p. 92) state that “Most of the leaders in successful processes we are aware of 
were instigators and inspirers” who built “capacity amongst others and [initiated] 
networks”.  This is a much wider role than simply chairing a meeting as was the case for 
the HWZC in the development of its ZIP.   
 
 
4.3 ZIP Translation 
While there are good reasons from the CRC’s perspective that a decision that was 
perceived by some as “interventionist”  had to be made   on the HWRRP1, there was  
some disquiet that this move had the potential to undermine the collaborative process. 
Some stakeholder groups expressed concern that a collaboratively produced 
recommendation could be overturned by the CRC.  We were left asking how one of the 
more important recommendations in the ZIP could have been endorsed by the zone 
committee if it was so deficient as to require subsequent CRC  intervention.  Was that a 
reflection of the fact that the zone committee members and stakeholder groups had not 
adequately understood the science on which the ZIP recommendations were based?  
 
At the instigation of CRC, new (and potentially more amenable to the HWZC) 
recommendations on implementation of water quality targets were subsequently 
developed within the zone committee based on deliberation during October and 
November 2011.  
 
From the point of view of ECAN, the HWZC had been made aware that they could not 
expect to commit ECAN to any actions in the Code of Conduct that was adopted by the 
HWZC on 6th September 20112.  This point was also made in the Terms of Reference3 for 
                                                          
1
 In particular the lifting of the moratorium on resource consent applications relating to water in the Hurunui 
River and its tributaries on 1 October 2011. 
2
 The Code of Conduct states: (http://ecan.govt.nz/publications/Council/hurunui-waiau-zone-committee-
agenda-060910.pdf) 
Limitation of power:  
15. The committee has no authority to commit Hurunui District Council or Environment Canterbury to any path 
or expenditure.  
17 
 
the committee.  Consequently, the HWZC could not have been unaware of the potential 
for one or more of their recommendations to be questioned or overturned by ECan and 
the Hurunui District Council.  Whether this point was well  understood by the wider 
stakeholder community is not known.  If ECan had not been faced with an imminent 
moratorium expiry deadline, then the inconsistency identified in the ZIP may have been 
referred back to the HWZC to be sorted out. 
 
That the HWZC undertook further deliberation to establish an alternative (and arguably 
potentially better) set of parameters to set and monitor water quality limits is testament 
to the power of the collaborative process.  It also illustrates our point about the need for 
better facilitation and deliberation within zone committees.   
 
4.4 Trust 
The importance of gaining and maintaining trust is thoroughly rehearsed in case studies 
from the literature.  It is well known that the intentional or unintentional undermining 
of trust and goodwill consistently serves to unravel collaborative processes (e.g. Innes 
and Booher, 2010).  Harkes (in Cox et al., 2006, np) for instance, suggests that “the real 
‘glue’ [of collaboration] is trust, legitimacy and transparency”.   
 
Informal conversations with members of the public at committee meetings showed that 
they were disappointed at what they perceived to be a breach of trust when the nitrate 
limit was temporarily raised in the HWRRP and the intent of the ZIP recommendation 
that  the zone committee members had contributed toward formulating appeared to 
have been changed.    
Throughout the ZIP development process, the HWZC showed that they took their 
responsibility towards community stakeholders very seriously and now, perhaps, felt 
that the trust they had built with them could potentially be damaged by events outside 
of their control.  Perhaps the committee set its expectations too high.  These events 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
16. The committee will operate in such a way as to not compromise the Hurunui District Council’s or 
Environment Canterbury’s freedom to deliberate and make such decisions as the Council(s) deem appropriate. 
3
 See http://ecan.govt.nz/publications/General/hurunui-waiau-initial-briefing-material.pdf 
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around the HWRRP highlight the challenge for the CRC as both facilitator and regulator 
and regarding  how and when it deploys its authority. 
 
Likewise, the CWMS may have raised false expectations when it  states that 
implementation programmes are “social contracts ... [and] legal processes that follow in 
the wake of the adoption of the programmes should not be allowed to undermine this 
balanced, holistic approach to managing water resources in each zone and across the 
region as a whole” (Canterbury Water, 2009, p. 15).  Arguably, the CWMS is not as 
explicit in recognising that zone committees cannot expect to commit ECan to any 
actions.  
 
 
4.5 Science Policy Interface 
An issue that is not well-explored in the collaborative governance literature is the 
dynamics of the science policy interface (Weber, Memon and Painter, 2011).  The 
translation of science into policy is usually conceived as an input/output process – 
assumed good science goes in one end and assumed good policy prescriptions come out 
the other end (Duncan 2011).  Of course, the reality is fraught with uncertainty and 
contestation, collectively described as knowledge politics.  From a theoretical 
perspective, the practice of using numbers to establish rules, based on the widely held 
assumption that these are value-free tools of environmental management, has its 
challenges (Porter 1992a, 1992b, 1995; Wynne 1988).  With an issue such as nutrient 
load limits, that is so politically controversial and where the science is so uncertain, 
difficulties arise in gaining agreement from both those who are to be regulated and 
those who want to see regulation enforced about how the numbers were arrived at and 
negotiated, and how they will be monitored and adjudicated.  It is our concern that the 
knowledge politics that has undermined the CRC’s past attempts to allocate water 
resources and regulate cumulative effects has not gone away (Weber, Memon and 
Painter, 2011) even though recourse to the courts has temporarily.  It occurs to us that 
an important difference is that a court case ultimately hands down a decision.  The 
danger for the Canterbury collaborative process is that there is potentially no resolution 
on these issues or that only continual tentative consensus is possible.   
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To resolve these issues, science policy theory would advocate that zone committees 
should become more closely involved in the process of developing the numbers and 
testing various scenarios with modellers in a process of knowledge co-production (i.e. a 
two-way process of knowledge-making) (Cash et al., 2006; Landstrom et al. 2011; Callon 
1999).  This knowledge co-production process is in contrast to the dominant mode of 
knowledge production (i.e. involving one-way communication) we observed occurring 
for the HWZC, which involved the committee being presented with numbers subsequent 
to their framing, testing and calculation by the Land Use and Water Quality Project 
(LUWQP) process.  We understand this situation was unavoidable in this case as the 
LUWQP had undertaken its work before the establishment of the HWZC.  We further 
understand that the LUWQP is more closely involved with other zone committees.   
 
While it appears this shortfall has been recognised by the CRC, we are unclear on how 
future processes will operate.  There are many lessons to be learned from the literature 
which provides a range of case studies on how to deal with issues associated with 
knowledge politics.  For example, convening, translation, collaboration and mediation 
have been identified as necessary institutional functions for the development of 
knowledge that is salient, credible and legitimate and for these knowledge attributes to 
be appropriately kept in balance (Cash et al., 2006).  There are also case studies which 
advocate the close involvement of stakeholders in the framing and developing of 
predictive computer models and their simulations (Cockerill et al. 2006; Costanza and 
Ruth 1998; Videira et al. 2009; Voinov and Bousquet 2010).  This is a departure from the 
LUWQP process for the Hurunui whereby stakeholders’ participation extended only to 
determining the acceptability of scenarios with which they were presented.  While there 
was flexibility in terms of the scenarios (with the addition two focusing on water quality 
objectives rather than development futures), the stakeholder group involvement in the 
knowledge production process was substantially limited which, according to theory, 
could have implications for the legitimacy and credibility of the derived catchment limits 
(Cash et al. 2006).  It should be noted that the relevance of these participatory modelling 
case studies is dependent upon the scale of the issue at hand and so their applicability 
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would need to be assessed to be fit for purpose.  This would appear to be an area for 
further research. 
 
4.6 Predictive Models 
Arguably, a reason why participatory predictive modelling has been found to be useful 
for producing knowledge and building consensus around contentious social-ecological 
issues is their inherent capacity to not only simply but also reify (i.e. to make real or 
concrete) (Duncan 2008; Porter 1995; Shackley and Wynne 1995).  A substantial 
proportion of the knowledge that underpins the achievement of the Hurunui-Waiau 
CWMS targets and the ZIP recommendations has been derived from predictive 
computer modelling.  The sociology of science literature is replete with warnings about 
how easy it is for policy-makers to see the numbers derived from predictive models as 
representing reality (e.g. Duncan 2008, 2006; Porter 1995; Pilkey and Pilkey-Jarvis 2007; 
Irwin 1989).  Planners and policy makers have a tendency to attribute considerable 
credibility to numbers and assume that they are value-free and speak for themselves.  
Moreover, it is also the case that the assumptions that become embedded in knowledge 
claims are often later discovered to be profoundly optimistic, unworkable in practice or 
irrelevant to the issue at hand.  What is difficult for policy-makers is that by the time 
scientific and economic conclusions get to them, the critical contingencies are obscured 
from view (or they exist in a very lengthy disclosure report that is difficult to decipher 
and to discern management implications).  It is our view that it needs to be held ‘front of 
mind’ that predictions into the future are hypothetical and dependent upon the 
assumptions and data that drive the predictive models (Duncan, 2003; 2006; 2008).  A 
question for us is what statutory capacity and scope does the CRC have if what is 
assumed will happen does not transpire?  On this score, we caution that adaptive 
management is a useful concept in theory but has proven to be profoundly difficult to 
implement in practice (e.g. Ladson and Argent, 2002; Allan and Curtis, 2005; Allan et al. 
2008).  
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4.7 Competing Knowledge Claims 
A further issue in this respect is how should the zone committees handle conflicting 
expert advice?  For example, in one instance, a Hurunui Water Project (HWP) expert and 
a representative from NIWA presented quite different views on the impact of the HWP 
storage proposal on the Hurunui River.  Incidentally, we see the practice of having 
experts present at the same time, known in environmental law as concurrent evidence 
or ‘hot tubbing’, as very useful for zone committees.  It allows interaction between the 
experts, the highlighting of agreement and differences in opinion, and opportunities for 
committee members to probe issues on which they are unclear.  Of concern was that in 
the HWZIP, the evidence of the latter expert only was presented and this was queried by 
the HWP representative on the HWZC.  This raised questions for us about how should 
the CRC and the zone committees deal with competing expert claims and, furthermore, 
make decisions about the credibility of the knowledge (usually scientific) with which 
they are presented.  We observed that the need for peer review was raised and 
implemented to a point  by  the HWZC but we question whether a more formal process 
might be needed. 
 
4.8 The Spirit of Collaboration 
The tension between the command and control approach of the RMA and the 
collaborative approach of the CWMS played out in some important respects.  It 
appeared to us that some groups entered into the spirit of collaboration e.g. the new 
farmer groups that formed with the aim of reducing nutrient discharge from their 
properties and recreation groups that compromised on their needs/preferences.  
However, there were other groups, industry groups in particular, where the significance 
of collaboration appears to be less well appreciated. For example, at the 10th September 
2011 meeting, comments from the committee members showed that they believed that 
Meridian Energy has yet to act in a collaborative fashion in pursuing its proposed 
Isolated Hill scheme.  At this same meeting, representatives of the HWP told the HWZC 
that they would be applying for resource consent for a storage scheme based on the 
Waitohi River.  This application was lodged before a study to determine which of several 
Waitohi storage schemes would be supported by the HWZC when it applied for funding 
for feasibility studies.  In the words of one community member, such a move shows little 
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respect for the collaborative process; but as both Meridian and HWP legitimately 
pointed out, “It’s a competitive situation out there” and “We have to apply because we 
need to be in a position where we have the option to look hard at the Waitohi”.  The 
RMA makes holding off applying for consents a risky process since first lodged schemes 
have priority.  There was clearly disappointment amongst both the HWZC and the 
public.  Comments were made that the RMA is flawed in that the best solution can be 
trumped by the first solution of whatever quality and merit.  An important question for 
us is how can the CRC compensate institutionally for the limitations of the RMA that 
ostensibly entrenches non-collaborative behaviour? 
 
4.9 Pre-determined Paths and Underlying Assumptions 
An issue that recurred in our research was the extent to which the ten targets of the 
CWMS directed the HWZC’s energy and deliberations along pre-determined paths.  The 
targets being (a) environmental health/biodiversity, (b) natural character of braided 
rivers, (c) Kaitiakitanga, (d) drinking water, (e) recreation and amenity opportunities, (f) 
water use efficiency, (g) irrigated land area, (h) energy security and efficiency, (i) 
regional and national economies  and (j) environmental limits.  There are many 
arguments that support such an approach (e.g. time saving, process facilitation, 
previous widespread consultation).  However, this framework also serves to close off 
discussion of some potential paths of inquiry and imposes artificial and possibly 
counter-productive boundaries around issues that cannot and should not be bounded, 
at least initially, in a collaborative and deliberative process.  For example, social and 
community well-being and quality of life are not targets but their attainment is 
assumed to be derivable from the targets.  In discussions we have had, there is 
anecdotal evidence that increased irrigation in other parts of New Zealand has led to 
increased casualisation of labour force (and reduced school rolls), an increased turnover 
in farm owners and a decrease in family farm ownership.  Preliminary results from one 
study in the North Island show that increased intensification has led to high debt levels 
and increased stress on farming families.  Irrigation, it appears, could inflate  the value 
of some farmland to such an extent that unforeseen consequences may devalue the 
social capital of the community rather than increase it.  Consequently, we are asking 
whether the social and economic implications of the targets and the assumptions 
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around irrigation have been sufficiently thought through during the course of the 
HWZIP process.   
 
From an academic perspective, we see considerable promise for tailoring responses and 
identifying a broader range of options by questioning the way in which problems have 
been framed.  It needs to be recognised during such a process that potential solutions 
often dictate the definition of a problem.  For example, an area where we see that the 
targets have constrained debate is over the options for the farms that do not include 
irrigation.  Many of the farmers in the area will not benefit from irrigation schemes 
because they are located in areas where the infrastructure will not reach.  Other farmers 
may not benefit because the cost of the delivered water may be too high.  There are few 
options for water storage in the area and it is unknown whether the government will 
assist with the cost of an environmentally benign but costly storage infrastructure.  
Some of the farmers in the area might, therefore, have been marginalised in the debate 
because it has concentrated on “irrigated land area” (as required by the CWMS).  If the 
“irrigated land area” target had been reframed as “improved profitability for farms” or 
“enhanced rural profitability” then options such as dry land farming could have been 
considered and potentially a broader scope of options for managing water supply and 
demand could be considered.   
 
Our concerns about underlying assumptions extend to audited self management (ASM) 
programmes.  The ZIP supports the implementation of ASM programmes and steps are 
already being taken and planned to encourage the uptake of such programmes.  The 
reality is that the effectiveness of such programmes is unproven, yet farmers are being 
asked to make financial commitments for currently unknowable benefits.  This situation 
represents considerable challenges for the CRC and risk for the Strategy in the long 
term.    Obviously, with insufficient resources and limited stakeholder support, the 
implementation phase could easily founder.  However, given the extent of the 
uncertainties, the same outcome could arise from extensive resources and 
overwhelming support.  Our question is, what if best practice does not deliver the 
currently assumed and needed gains. 
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    5. CRITICAL ROLE OF ZONE COMMITTEES IN IMPLEMENTING THE CWMS 
During the course of our investigations, it became increasingly evident that the zone 
committees are a critical link in the implementation chain between the CWMS and the 
RMA planning instruments. This is because, as discussed below, the CWMS is primarily a 
non-statutory planning document while RMA planning instruments carry the force of 
law. The CWMS and ZIP recommendations are not binding on district and regional 
councils. The challenging role for zone committees is to mediate the regional outcomes 
in the CWMS by grounding them on a zonal basis and oversee their subsequent 
embedding into statutory regional and district council planning instruments.  
 
In undertaking this role, zone committees have to be cognisant that the special 
legislation for ECan gives strong powers to Commissioners to expedite preparation of 
statutory planning instruments in order to resolve long-standing water conflicts in 
Canterbury. The effectiveness of zone committees in achieving CWMS outcomes is 
therefore critically dependent on a commonly agreed understanding about their role as 
an interface between the Strategy and RMA planning instruments. Our key research 
finding in this respect is that ambiguity that prevailed then in the relationship between 
the CWMS, the HWZC and the Canterbury Regional Council proved to be problematic in 
giving statutory force to zonal recommendations.  
 
5.1 Relationship between the CWMS and HWZC 
 The Strategy was crafted between 2008 and 2010. It sets out a way forward towards 
sustainable management and use of Canterbury’s water resources.  It does this by 
spelling out substantive region wide outcomes for water allocation and management 
(stated as priorities/principles and regional targets). It also sets out a collaborative 
institutional framework based on zone committees to translate regional outcomes into 
zone based outcomes.  
Arguably, the Strategy lacks sharp teeth. The Strategy was developed as a partnership 
between Environment Canterbury, Canterbury’s district councils and Ngāi Tahu and 
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selected environmental and industry stakeholders.  It was crafted as a process of 
deliberation by a Steering Group under the guidance of the Canterbury Mayoral Forum4  
and has been endorsed5 by the eleven individual Canterbury local authorities and the 
Canterbury Mayoral Forum. The Strategy is thus akin to a social contract and currently 
carries limited formal standing except to the extent that its visions and principles have 
been included in the Environment Canterbury (Temporary Commissioners and Improved 
Water Management) Act enacted in April 20106. The Strategy is also acknowledged in the 
Regional Policy Statement (2011), the Proposed Hurunui and Waiau Regional Plan (draft 
2012) and is expected to be included in  the Proposed  Land and Water Regional Plan 
(draft 2012). The status of ZIPs  is also comparable to the CWMS in this respect. To be 
effectively implemented, ZIP recommendations need to be incorporated into statutory 
planning instruments such as the Proposed Hurunui and Waiau Regional Plan (draft 
2012.) 
 
5.2 Relationship between HWZC and ECan:  
Lack of clarity about the status of this relationship became the Achilles heel of the 
collaborative process.  Responsibility for RMA planning instruments in Canterbury comes 
under the purview of  the regional and district councils. The ECan Act gives strong 
executive powers to the Cabinet appointed Commissioners to expedite the plan 
preparation process at the regional level. Territorial local authorities in Canterbury lack 
comparable powers.  
 
A key question is to what extent was it appropriate for ECan Commissioners to mediate 
the incorporation of collaboratively agreed HZIP recommendations into statutory 
planning instruments?  The CWMS is ambiguous in this respect partly because this is a 
politically fraught issue and lack of clarity then enabled ECan to successfully contest the 
                                                          
4 The Canterbury Mayoral Forum is a non statutory body made up of the mayors and chief  
executives of the regional territorial authorities and Environment Canterbury. 
5
 The Federated Farmers group is also expected to endorse the Strategy and Ngāi Tahu are supporting the 
process (without formal endorsement at this stage). 
6
 As explained below, the Act replaced the governing body of ECan with appointed commissioners.  It gives 
Commissioners power to impose moratoria on new applications for water and discharge permits, sets up a 
new regime for water conservation orders in Canterbury, and alters certain aspects of the process for 
approving regional policy statements and plans.  
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stance of the HWZC.  The current stance of ECan appears to be that it can intervene in 
order to protect the wider public interest. In this respect, ECan sees itself as a regional 
guardian to protect against the risk of ‘tyranny of zone committee collaborators’.  Those 
who question this stance argue that ECan intervention runs the risk of undermining the 
legitimacy of the collaborative rhetoric that underpins the CWMS. 
 
While some of the zone committee recommendations are implemented regionally, those 
pertaining to land use regulation come under the statutory purview of district councils. 
How expeditiously and effectively this is accomplished will depend on the degree of 
commitment of district councils to regulating farming activities.  
 
6.  REFLECTIONS 
The current approach to water governance in Canterbury, based on a hybrid model of 
collaboration and statutory planning, is akin to a social experiment. While the 
collaborative process does not replace the RMA process, it is expected in important 
respects to ‘soften’ hitherto adversarial RMA practices via social learning.   
 
Perhaps it is not surprising that many elements of the Canterbury model have been 
encapsulated in the recommendations to the Government for improved water 
governance in New Zealand by the Land and Water Forum (www.landandwater.org). It is 
important for this reason that the Canterbury experience is evaluated and the research 
findings shared with a wide range of stakeholders within New Zealand. 
 
Viewed from this perspective, while the findings of our report are useful, they must be 
judged as preliminary. HWZC is one of the ten zone committees and was the first one to 
get off the ground. It is necessary to evaluate the remaining nine zone committee 
processes to verify the findings of our report. 
 
The HWZC process cannot be deemed as typical of or representative of all zone 
committees. It differs from subsequent zone committee processes in two respects. 
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First, the Land Use and Water Quality Group did much of its scientific data gathering and 
analysis and modelling of options on the Hurunui and Waiau catchments prior to the 
commencement of the HWZC deliberations.  As we have explained above, this time lag 
became an issue in forging a close science/policy interface.  Second, the October 1 2011 
moratorium expiry deadline put pressure on the HWZC to finalise and submit its report 
to the CRC.  In our view, this is another possible reason why all members of the zone 
committee did not clearly grasp the full implications of the recommendations in their 
final report to the regional council related to the debate about creating head room for 
new irrigation.  As has been explained above, the CRC was subsequently compelled to 
take certain actions to rectify this situation but whose intent was then questioned by 
some members of the zone committee.   
 
This situation should not arise with the other nine zone committees. The CRC has gone 
to some length during the last few months to clarify the relationship between zone 
committees and the Council and none of the other stakeholders groups have attempted 
to contest this interpretation. Zone committee are joint committees of CRC and the TLAs 
and zone committee reports are recommendations to the Council and the TLAs. In this 
sense, as noted earlier, zone committee deliberations are not binding on local 
authorities. However, one would expect the regional and district councils  to provide 
valid reasons for not accepting zone committee recommendations if this proved to be 
the case.  
 
While the following may be seen as  a point of academic interest only , it ought to be 
mentioned that the approach to collaboration that has been adopted by zone 
committees in Canterbury significantly differs from what the international  academic 
literature recommends in two respects.  First, as noted earlier, the HWZC members were 
handpicked.  For example, DoC and power companies were not members. Second, as we 
have seen, the outcomes of zone committee deliberations are not binding on local 
authorities. Arguably, the Canterbury zone committee process is a lesser version of the 
deliberative collaboration practice model as commonly understood in the international 
literature. 
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To sum up, the substantive outcomes achieved by the HWZC as a collaborative process 
may be summarised   as follows: 
 All groups gave up something and received something. There were wins on all sides 
 Understandably, each party say that they would have liked more. 
 Primary producers gained head room for increased irrigation  to permit 
intensification 
 Environmentalists have secured protection for conservation values, including native 
species, braided rivers, native fish and improved water quality 
 Lake Sumer does not appear as vulnerable now in terms of being harnessed for 
power production or irrigation as Waitohi may be an alternative. 
 Recreationists have managed to secure protection of some of the best kayaking 
spots in the country  
 Maori achieved protection  of mahina kai values 
 The above gains have been framed as an integrated approach to catchment 
management. 
From a longer term perspective, one could argue that further to reaching consensus on 
setting flows and water quality limits, the more important significance of the zone 
committee process should be judged as an initiative to promote social learning and 
enhance social capital. The HWZC process is an important initiative in shifting away from 
a “plan, notify, defend’ modus operandi psyche embedded in the minds of many RMA 
actors. On this score, one could provisionally conclude that there is a small group of 
people now committed to the  RMA draft Proposed Hurunui and Waiau Regional Plan 
and will act as advocates for it amongst their constituencies. The extent to which the 
zone committee commitment to the draft plan is more widely shared by others will 
become evident with the tenor of their submissions to the draft plan.  
To what extent the zone committee process experience will modify the adversarial 
“rules of the game” practices during the RMA hearings of the plan will also tell us how 
beneficial the zone committee process has been in this respect or whether it has served 
to add to the  cost and length of  the water planning process.  
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
The question that was central to our research was how has the CWMS been 
implemented in practice in the Hurunui Waiau Zone?  A further question that developed 
over time was how has the Canterbury Regional Council managed its dual role of 
facilitator of the process and regulator?  The literature is clear that implementing 
collaborative governance is incredibly challenging and not at all straightforward.  This 
was certainly borne out in the Hurunui Waiau case.  These challenges notwithstanding, it 
was our observation that many of the necessary elements for collaboration were in 
place and many of its impediments were recognised along the way by the CRC and the 
HWZC and strategies were incorporated to accommodate them.  This demonstrated 
flexibility and adaptability within the institutions charged with implementing the CWMS.  
In addition, commitments that align with the following collaborative governance 
principles were observed: scientific accuracy, seeking out and including the 
views/suggestions of stakeholders, clarity of boundaries, future monitoring of resource 
user behaviour, an understanding that costs and benefits to resource users must be 
aligned and the clear intention that participants include but do not represent the views 
of their constituents.  There is no doubt that the collaborative governance model that is 
proceeding in Canterbury is changing attitudes, building relationships and developing a 
new model for water governance.  There is also no doubt that the staff of the CRC have 
worked tirelessly to implement the CWMS.   
 
To link our observations with theory and make recommendations for improved practice, 
we close with the following questions for discussion by the CRC, both internally amongst 
Commissioners and officials, and with zone committees and other stakeholders in 
Canterbury. This is followed by recommendations for research. 
 
1. How should the Canterbury Regional Council manage its dual roles of facilitator of 
the zone committee process and as a regulatory planning authority?    
 
2.  How should district councils manage their dual roles of participants in the zonal 
committee process and as a regulatory planning authority? 
 
3. How can the shifts in perspectives within the HWZC continue to be translated 
outside the committee? 
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4. How can relationships developed by HWZC be sustained in the long term? 
 
5. How can two-way dialogue occur with stakeholders beyond those selected by the 
HWZC? 
 
6. How can the CRC facilitate deliberation as well as collaboration within zone 
committees? 
 
7. Is there a need for a broadened role for the Facilitator and the Chairperson? 
 
8. How can the articulation of complex science issues, underlying assumptions and 
decision consequences be improved within zone committees? 
 
9. Does the CRC need to rebuild trust after its intervention on the Hurunui nutrient 
load limit? How? 
 
10. How can institutional functions of convening, translation, collaboration and 
mediation be instilled in knowledge production processes to facilitate the 
production of salient, credible and legitimate knowledge? 
 
11. How can the CRC ensure that zone committees and their supporting networks of 
stakeholders and constituents have realistic expectations about what will happen to 
their decisions and recommendations? 
 
12. How can the CRC compensate within the collaborative process for non-collaborative 
behaviour ostensibly entrenched by the RMA? 
 
13. What process does the CRC have in place to question and challenge the 
assumptions and problem framings that underpin its strategies and what capacity 
does it have to adjust if there is a realisation that these have been unrealistic? 
 
14. How can the potential of the zone committee process to enhance social learning 
and build social capital be enhanced? 
 
 
8. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH: 
1. How well has the interface between the collaborative zone process and the 
statutory RMA regional process functioned and how can it be improved? E.g. what 
are the perspectives of different stakeholders about how zone committee 
recommendations are taken on board by the regional council and  
TLAs ? 
 
2. How well has the interface between the collaborative zone process and the statutory 
RMA district process functioned and how can it be improved? E.g. what are the 
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perspectives of different stakeholders about how zone committee recommendations 
are taken on board by the TLAs? 
 
3. To what extent has the benefit of participating in the zone committee process 
provided incentives for actors in the RMA statutory process to ‘soften’ the RMA 
“rules of the game” at the regional and district council levels? 
 
4. To what extent has the benefit of participating in the zone committee process served 
to reduce the cost and length of the water planning process (regional and district 
levels).  
 
5. How effective has the role of Maori been in governance of the Hurunui-Waiau rivers 
within the HWZC framework. 
 
6. What opportunities might there be for implementing CWMS targets with the use of 
participatory predictive modelling. 
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